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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CENSORS IN CYBERSPACE: CAN CONGRESS PROTECT
CHILDREN FROM INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY DESPITE
ASHCROFT v. ACLU?

I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a forum unlike any other. Whether you want to view Tupac
Shakur’s autopsy photos, relive Janet Jackson’s 2004 “wardrobe malfunction”
or chat with fellow church goers, you can do it all online. This “marketplace
of ideas”1 for the twenty-first century enables people to communicate, for no
cost, with others throughout the world. And, young or old, the world is
logging on. As of 2004, approximately sixty-two percent of all Americans
regularly used the Internet.2 Today, 6.4 billion Internet users around the
world3 can access any of the innumerable Web sites available online or send
messages of their own.
But where there is free speech, there is controversy. Some twelve percent
of all Web sites contain pornographic material4 that varies “from the modestly
titillating to the hardest-core.”5 These sites are easily accessible to children
under eighteen; in fact, children ages twelve to seventeen represent the largest
group of pornography consumers.6 Studies show that the average child first
views pornographic material on the Internet at age eleven, and that
approximately eighty percent of all children have viewed numerous hard-core
pornography Web sites by the age of seventeen.7

1. The phrase “marketplace of ideas” is a metaphor for the idea that “the source of the
message is the seller. She or he is allowed to express ideas to anyone who is wiling to listen. The
receiver of the message is like the buyer, and may freely decide to agree or disagree with the
message.” DOUGLAS M. FRALEIGH & JOSEPH S. TRUMAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: IN THE
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 13 (1997). This idea has formed the basis for judicial opinions limiting
government control over speech. Id. at 13–14.
2. PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, INTERNET: THE MAINSTREAMING OF
ONLINE LIFE 59 (2005), http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/Internet_Status_2005.pdf.
3. Internet
World
Stats,
Internet
Usage
Statistics–The
Big
Picture,
http://internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
4. Internet Filter Review, Internet Pornography Statistics, http://internet-filterreview.toptenreviews.com/internet-pornography-statistics.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
5. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997) (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,
844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
6. Internet Filter Review, supra note 4.
7. Id.
957
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Minors’ increasing access to Internet pornography has not escaped
congressional attention. In 1996, Congress passed the Communications
Decency Act (CDA),8 which forbade the transmission of indecent or patently
offensive materials to minors over the Internet.9 Web site providers and free
speech advocates immediately challenged the CDA in American Civil Liberties
Union v. Reno.10 Reno eventually reached the Supreme Court, where the
majority wrote that the CDA’s overbreadth and vagueness rendered it
unconstitutional.11 However, the Court’s decision in Reno went beyond
merely finding a First Amendment violation. The Court, comparing the CDA
to similar statutes that had passed constitutional muster, implied that Congress
could transform the CDA into legislation that would pass First Amendment
scrutiny.12 The Court seemed to assure Congress that it could regulate the
Internet.
Armed with the Court’s suggestions from Reno, Congress immediately
began considering proposals for new Internet legislation.13 Congress remedied
many of the problems the Court found with the CDA, and in 1998 created the
Child Online Protection Act (COPA).14 Several plaintiffs immediately
challenged COPA as violating the First Amendment rights of Internet
speakers.15 COPA trudged through the courts, and reached the Supreme Court
for a second time in 2004.16 On July 29, 2004, in a five-to-four decision, the
8. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000). President Clinton signed the CDA into law on Feb. 8, 1996.
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 826–27. The CDA composes Title V of the Telecommunications Act of
1996. Id.
9. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d). Some blame the Time magazine article “On a Screen Near You:
Cyberporn” of enraging the public and fueling Congress to enact the CDA. Yaman Akdeniz,
Governing Pornography & Child Pornography on the Internet: The UK Approach, 32 UWLA L.
REV. 247, 247 n.2 (2001); Norman Solomon, How Time Magazine Promoted a Cyberhoax,
ALTERNET, Apr. 26, 2000, http://www.alternet.org/columnists/story/8744/. The Time article
declared that 83.5% of images stored on Usenet groups were pornographic and reported that
viewing pornographic material is one of the largest recreational computer uses. Philip ElmerDewitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberporn, TIME, July 3, 1995, at 38. Three weeks later Time
retracted the article, stating that the study it was based on “grossly exaggerated the extent of
pornography on the Internet” and included statistics that were “misleading or meaningless.”
Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Fire Storm on the Computer Nets, TIME, July 24, 1995, at 57.
10. 929 F. Supp. at 827 & n.2.
11. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874, 882, 884 (1997).
12. Id. at 864–86.
13. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476–77 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (stating that Congress
tried to remedy the CDA with new legislation).
14. Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified as 47
U.S.C. § 231 (2000)). COPA has been dubbed “the son of the CDA” due to the similarities
between the two statutes. See, e.g., Golden Gate University Library, The Sons of the CDA:
Filtering the Internet by Law, http://internet.ggu.edu/university_library/if/son_of_cda.html (last
visited Sept. 17, 2005).
15. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
16. Ashcroft v. ACLU 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
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Court found that COPA violated the First Amendment despite Congress’s
compliance with the Court’s suggestions in Reno.17 Again, however, the Court
reiterated that constitutional legislation could be effected.18 Rather than strike
COPA down as unconstitutional, the Court remanded it for a full trial based on
new evidence regarding the Internet, COPA, and the Web.19 Should the
government press the legislation, the remand will mark the sixth time a court
has considered COPA.20
Today, Congress is left with the Court’s seemingly inconsistent decisions
and what might seem an empty promise that protective legislation is possible.
To put the issues inherent in Internet legislation into context, Part II of this
comment will summarize the history of obscenity and indecency law. Part III
will examine a case in which the Court upheld federal Internet legislation,
United States v. American Library Association.21 Part IV will review the
Court’s decisions regarding the CDA and COPA and carefully consider the
differences between these two acts. Part V will propose a solution to COPA’s
First Amendment pitfalls and consider whether Congress should attempt to
enact such legislation, should COPA ultimately fail. Additionally, Part V will
consider other ways that Congress can protect children from harmful Internet
materials. Part VI concludes that Congress will not be able to create COPAlike legislation that is both constitutional and effective, although it may be able
to attain its goal of protecting children from Internet pornography through
other means.
II. HISTORY
A.

Obscenity and Indecency Law
1.

Obscenity Law

The First Amendment to the Constitution states that “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”22 Although it might seem
that the First Amendment is composed of “plain words, easily understood,”23

17. Id. at 660–61, 673.
18. Id. at 672–73.
19. Id.
20. The COPA cases in chronological order are: ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D.
Pa. 1999); ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002);
ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
21. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23. MADELEINE SCHACHTER, LAW OF INTERNET SPEECH 3 (2d ed. 2002) (quoting Hugo L.
Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 865, 874 (1960)). Justice Black has been deemed an
“absolutist” for his belief that the First Amendment’s language demands total protection for all
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the Supreme Court has never interpreted the First Amendment in such an
absolute manner. Rather, the Court has traditionally sought to strike a balance
between free expression and interests that necessitate protection. Entire
categories of speech, such as child pornography,24 libel,25 and “fighting
words,”26 have been categorically denied the protections of the First
Amendment as a result of the Court’s balance. Thus, one may be civilly or
criminally liable for these types of speech despite the First Amendment.
Obscenity is another category of speech that does not receive First
Amendment protection.27 Some claim that obscenity should not be protected
because of its “dangerous effect on susceptible populations;” others claim that
lewd expression should not contaminate other, more valuable speech.28 The
Court, in balancing the value of free expression against its harm, has found that
obscenities serve “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”29
The Court’s proclamation that the First Amendment does not protect
obscene speech was the easy part. The Court’s next step was to determine
what the term “obscenity” really meant. Due process requires not only that the
law define obscenity, but also that its definition give unambiguous notice to
speakers whose material may fall within its meaning.30 Justice Brennan voiced
his concern that obscenity was impossible to define with “sufficient specificity
and clarity to provide fair notice to persons who create and distribute sexually
oriented materials.”31 He further stated that failure to precisely define
obscenity could result in the “substantial erosion of protected speech as a

speech “without any ‘ifs’ or ‘buts,’ or ‘whereases.’” Id. (quoting Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting)).
24. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 752, 765 (1982). In upholding a statute that banned
the distribution of material depicting minors engaging in sexual performances, the Court found
the value of the speech at issue “exceedingly modest” in comparison to the state’s interest in
“safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor.” Id. at 762, 756–57 (quoting
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
25. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961).
26. “Fighting words” are defined as “face-to-face insults that will likely provoke a
reasonable person to violence.” JOHN F. WIRENIUS, FIRST AMENDMENT, FIRST PRINCIPLES:
VERBAL ACTS AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 101 (rev. ed. 2004). This category of unprotected
speech is strictly limited, but does still exist. Id.; see, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362–
63 (2003) (finding that a state ban on cross-burning with the intent to intimidate does not violate
the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
27. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21 (1973).
28. See NAN LEVINSON, OUTSPOKEN: FREE SPEECH STORIES 146 (2003).
29. Miller, 413 U.S. at 20–21 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)).
30. See id. at 27.
31. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 103 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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byproduct of the attempt to suppress unprotected speech.”32 In other words,
speakers that are not sure whether their speech amounts to obscenity might
choose silence in the face of civil or criminal liability.
The Court has struggled to define obscenity from the beginning. The first
definition of obscenity recognized in America originated from the 1868
English case The Queen v. Hicklin.33 In Hicklin, an English man named Henry
Scott was convicted of violating an anti-obscenity act.34 Scott distributed an
anti-Catholic publication entitled “The Confessional Unmasked,” which
included a discussion of “Questions Put to Females in Confession.”35 On
appeal, the Court of Queen’s Bench found that Scott’s publication did, in fact,
violate the anti-obscenity act and adopted the following definition of
obscenity: “whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences,
and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.”36 In addition to
defining obscenity, Hicklin gave two standards to detect it. The first standard
deemed materials obscene based on how they were perceived by the most
susceptible of people, such as a children; the second examined materials in
isolated passages, rather than as a whole work.37 In 1896, America adopted
Hicklin’s obscenity standards.38
The Hicklin standard, though criticized for denying protection to a wide
range of speech,39 defined obscenity in the United States until Roth v. United
States reached the Supreme Court in 1957.40 In Roth, a New York publisher
was convicted of violating a federal law that prohibited the mailing of obscene
materials.41 The majority reiterated that obscene speech is not constitutionally
protected and stated the following:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance . . . have the
full protection of the guaranties [of the First Amendment], unless excludable
because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But

32. Id.; see also Michael Kahn, Bulls in the China Shop: Obscenity Law in America, 5
BELLES LETTRES: A LITERARY REV. 23, 23 (Dec. 2004–Feb. 2005).
33. The Queen v. Hicklin, [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360; see also THOMAS L. TEDFORD, FREEDOM
OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 133–34 (2d ed. 1993).
34. TEDFORD, supra note 33, at 133.
35. Kahn, supra note 32, at 23.
36. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. at 371.
37. See Kahn, supra note 32, at 23.
38. Id. (referring to the Supreme Court’s approach in Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29
(1896)).
39. In a 1913 obscenity case, Judge Learned Hand argued that the Hicklin test protected only
materials deemed appropriate for a “child’s library.” TEDFORD, supra note 33, at 134 (citing
United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (1913)).
40. 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
41. Id. at 480.
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implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as
utterly without redeeming social importance.42

The Court further emphasized that “sex and obscenity are not synonymous,”
and called obscenity “material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to
prurient interest.”43 The Court declared that the First Amendment protects
sexual content in art, literature, and scientific works.44
The majority then articulated its new test: “whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.”45 This new test revised
Hicklin’s obscenity standard in two ways.46 First, Roth required courts to
consider the material in question as a whole, rather than in isolated passages, as
Hicklin had required.47 Second, the Roth test measured obscenity by the values
of the “average” person, rather than by “particularly susceptible” persons.48
However, the obscure words with which the Court defined obscenity in
Roth, such as “worthless,” “prurient,” and “contemporary community
standards,” did little to create a comprehensible definition of obscenity.49
Throughout the remainder of the 1950s and 1960s, “[t]he predictable result [of
obscenity cases] was unpredictability.”50 Justice Potter Stewart best summed
up the Court’s dilemma when he stated, “I could never succeed in intelligibly
[defining obscenity]. But I know it when I see it . . . .”51
Sixteen years later, the Court again sought to clarify its definition of
obscenity. Miller v. California52 provided the opportunity and led the Court to
create today’s obscenity standard. In Miller, the defendant was convicted of
mailing unsolicited advertisements for pornographic books to a mother and her
son in violation of state law.53 Seeing its opportunity to revise Roth, the Court
handed down its new test, defining material as “obscene” if:

42. Id. at 484.
43. Id. at 487.
44. Id.
45. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
46. Kahn, supra note 32, at 24.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. “Over the next several years, the judges of the Supreme Court learned that their
definition of obscenity was not clear to others. Furthermore, they found that they rarely agreed
among themselves about the meaning of their own words.” TEDFORD, supra note 34, at 138.
50. Kahn, supra note 32, at 24. “Apart from the initial formulation in the Roth case, no
majority of the Court has at any given time been able to agree on a standard to determine what
constitutes obscene, pornographic material subject to regulation under the States’ police power.”
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973). See generally Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767
(1967).
51. Kahn, supra note 32, at 23 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)).
52. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
53. Id. at 16–18.
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(a) . . . the average person, applying contemporary community standards would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . (b) . . .
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) . . . the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.54

The Miller test altered the Roth test in several important ways. While keeping
the “contemporary community standards” language of Roth, the Court in
Miller interpreted the language to refer to state rather than national standards.55
Thus, the new standard allowed states to adopt their own standards of
obscenity. The Miller test also required state legislatures to specifically define
material that its anti-obscenity statutes would ban.56 Further, the Court found
that material does not have to be “utterly without redeeming social value” as
Roth required.57 Even if the material has some social value, states now had the
authority to treat it as obscene.
Because speech that meets Miller’s obscenity test is not protected by the
First Amendment, Congress can legislate, ban, or criminalize such speech
without First Amendment concerns.58 Indeed, Congress has criminalized
selling, mailing, importing, and transporting obscenity, as well as the broadcast
of obscenity over the airwaves or on cable television.59 Although there is no
question that Congress is authorized to regulate obscenity, this authority has
been difficult to implement where the Internet is concerned. Parts III and IV
will examine Congress’s struggles in detail.
B.

Indecency Law

In Reno the Court stated that “[i]n evaluating the free speech rights of
adults, we have made it perfectly clear that ‘[s]exual expression which is

54. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 24, 31–33. The Miller Court further stated that “[n]othing in the First Amendment
requires that a jury must consider hypothetical and unascertainable ‘national standards . . . .’” Id.
at 31. “It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring
that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las
Vegas, or New York City.” Id. at 32. The “contemporary community standards” test has
received a great deal of criticism. In the case of the Internet, where the speaker reaches a
nationwide audience, the definition of obscenity is determined by the standards of the most
conservative community with Internet access. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877–78 (1997); see
also WIRENIUS, supra note 26, at 94.
56. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 23, 27.
59. Emily Vander Wilt, Comment, Considering COPA: A Look at Congress’s Second
Attempt to Regulate Indecency on the Internet, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 373, 383 (2004) (citing
18 U.S.C. §§ 1460–1468, 1470 (2000)).
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indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.’”60 Also
difficult to define, the term “indecency” includes speech that “borders on
obscenity” as well as speech that is explicit, but that has literary, artistic,
scientific, or political value, or that otherwise falls short of Miller’s obscenity
test.61 Indecency has been described in many different ways, such as “sexually
explicit,”62 “lewd or lascivious, obscene or grossly vulgar, unbecoming,
unseemly, unfit to be seen or heard, or [speech that otherwise] violates the
proprieties of language or behavior,”63 and as speech that contains “patently
offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and activities.”64 Although
courts and legislatures have tried to define the term, the definitions are often as
subjective and vague as the term “indecency” itself.
Indecent speech is provided First Amendment protection; nevertheless, it
has little social worth “in the hierarchy of First Amendment values.”65 This
lowered value is the basis for the Court’s finding that the government can
regulate indecent speech, in some instances, despite the First Amendment.
Regulations based on the nature of speech are considered “content-based”
regulations.66 The Court views government regulations based on the content of
the speaker’s message among the most repressive and subjects such regulations
to strict scrutiny analysis.67 Under strict scrutiny analysis, the government can
employ content-based regulations on protected speech only if the regulations
are narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest and no other
less restrictive means are available to achieve the government interest.68
Although the Court has not provided a clear definition of “indecency,” it
has created indecency doctrines that provide more or less First Amendment
protection based on the medium the speaker uses.69 Broadcast media, for
60. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874 (quoting Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989)).
61. Patrick M. Garry, The Flip Side of the First Amendment: A Right to Filter, 2004 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 57, 79 (citing Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
62. See Wilt, supra note 59, at 385.
63. 50 AM. JUR. 2D Lewdness, Indecency, and Obscenity § 2 (1995) (citing Commonwealth
v. Buckley, 86 N.E. 910 (Mass. 1909), People v. Eastman, 81 N.E. 459 (N.Y. 1907), and
Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, 133 A.2d 865 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1957), rev’d on other grounds,
153 A.2d 227 (Pa. 1959)).
64. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978).
65. Id. at 746.
66. See Ivan Hare, Method and Objectivity in Free Speech Adjudication: Lessons From
America, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 49, 51 (2005).
67. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004) (“Content-based prohibitions . . .
have the constant potential to be a repressive force in the lives and thoughts of a free people.”);
U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874
(1997); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
68. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 874.
69. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748; Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969);
Garry, supra note 61, at 80. For an in-depth explanation of media-based protection of indecent
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example, receives the lowest level of First Amendment protection.70 The
Court has reasoned that the pervasive nature of broadcast media, such as
television and radio, justifies a lesser protection.71 It has stated that “prior
warnings cannot completely protect the listener . . . . To say that one may avoid
further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like
saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow.”72
Print media, on the other hand, receives almost unlimited First Amendment
protection. 73 The Court has stated that “[a] responsible press is an
undoubtedly desirable goal,” although not constitutionally mandated.74
Telecommunications and cable speech, like print speech, receive a
heightened level of protection. Telephone speech in the form of pre-recorded
explicit messages, also known as “dial-a-porn,” has sparked the most
controversy. In the landmark decision Sable Communications of California v.
FCC, 75 the Court considered the constitutionality of Communications Act
amendments that absolutely banned obscene and indecent prerecorded
messages.76 The Court held that an absolute ban on indecent speech would
violate the First Amendment by denying adults their right to engage in
protected speech and would result in “limiting the content of adult telephone
conversations to that which is suitable for children to hear.”77 Furthermore,
hearing an explicit message requires taking the “affirmative steps” of dialing a
speech, see Bradley J. Stein, Comment, Why Wait? A Discussion of Analogy and Judicial
Standards for the Internet in Light of the Supreme Court’s Reno v. ACLU Opinion, 42 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 1471 (1998).
70. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. In Pacifica, the defendant radio station aired George Carlin’s
aptly entitled comedy routine, “Filthy Words.” Id. at 729–30. The Court upheld the FCC’s
finding that the broadcast was indecent and that its prohibition was consistent with the First
Amendment. Id. at 731–32, 748–51. See generally MATTHEW L. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY
WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES 119–30 (1986).
71. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–49.
72. Id. at 49.
73. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256–58 (1974). In Miami
Herald, the Supreme Court considered whether a Florida statute that required newspapers to grant
political candidates equal space, at no cost, to reply to criticism violated the First Amendment.
Id. at 244–45. The Court emphasized that print speech receives the highest level of First
Amendment protection and stated:
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on
the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials—
whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet
to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised
consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this
time.
Id. at 258.
74. Id. at 256.
75. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
76. Id. at 118.
77. Id. at 131.
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“1-900 number,” unlike broadcast media where one must simply turn on the
television.78 The Court also found telephone speech less pervasive than
broadcast and declined to reduce its First Amendment protection.79
The Court has regarded speech in cable media as “[t]he closest precedent”
to Internet speech, and, tellingly for the future of the Internet, has provided it a
heightened level of protection.80 In the recent decision United States v.
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., the Court examined section 505 of the
Telecommunications Act.81 Congress created the Act to protect children from
imprecise scrambling that sometimes allowed discernable sounds or images to
reach viewers.82 The Act required cable providers to either scramble sexually
explicit channels in full or to limit explicit programming to hours when
children would be less likely to see them.83
The Court in Playboy found that the Act restricted speech based on its
content and applied its strict scrutiny test.84 Cable television allows viewers
the option to block the transmission of unwanted channels, unlike broadcast
media.85 The Court found that this alternative clashed with the government’s
argument that the Act was the least restrictive means available to meet its
purpose.86 Thus, the Court held the Act restricted protected speech in violation
of the First Amendment.87
III. PREVIOUS FEDERAL INTERNET LEGISLATION AND THE COURT
In addition to understanding obscenity and indecency law, it is important
to consider the Court’s previous rulings regarding Internet legislation to better
predict where Internet regulation may be headed. In response to the increasing
number of library patrons, including minors, accessing Internet pornography
from public libraries, Congress passed the Children’s Internet Protection Act of
2000 (CIPA).88 CIPA provided that a public school or library may not receive
federal assistance to provide Internet access unless it installs software to block

78. Id. at 127–28.
79. Id. at 128, 130–31.
80. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 670 (2004).
81. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 806 (2000).
82. Id.
83. Id. To comply with the statute, most cable operators eliminated the transmission of
indecent programming between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. Id. at 806–07. “[F]or two-thirds of the day no
household in those service areas could receive the programming, whether or not the
household . . . wanted to do so.” Id. at 807.
84. Id. at 813.
85. Id. at 815.
86. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815–16.
87. Id. at 827.
88. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A–335 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000) and
various sections of 20 U.S.C.).
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images that constitute obscenity or child pornography.89 Several plaintiffs,
including groups of public libraries, library associations, library patrons, and
Web publishers, challenged the Act in United States v. American Library
Ass’n.90 Plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that CIPA induced libraries to
violate the First Amendment rights of adult library patrons.91 In a plurality
opinion, the Supreme Court disagreed.92
In its opinion, the Court first considered the level of scrutiny it should
apply to CIPA and chose not to apply heightened scrutiny because “public
libraries seek to provide materials ‘that would be of the greatest direct benefit
or interest to the community,’”93 rather than “a public forum for Web
publishers to express themselves.”94 Next, the Court emphasized that CIPA
would affect only federal funds intended to assist libraries in obtaining
educational and informational material.95 The Court found that Congress could
condition receipt of funds on whether they are used in the manner anticipated
and authorized.96
Although the blocking software CIPA required sometimes filtered out
protected material, this flaw was not fatal.97 CIPA permitted patrons that
wished to disable filters to do so on request.98 A final point made by the Court
89. § 1712, 114 Stat. at 2763A–340.
90. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
91. Id. at 210.
92. Id. at 214. Before CIPA reached the Supreme Court, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held CIPA to violate the First Amendment. Am. Library
Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 490 (E.D. Pa. 2002), rev’d, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
The district court found that the Act was not narrowly tailored and that less-restrictive alternatives
existed. Id. at 475–84. The finding largely resulted from evidence that suggested filtering
technology is often “underblocking” or “overblocking,” and likely to either fail to filter out
explicit material or to block protected material. Id. at 476–77.
93. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 204 (quoting Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 421).
94. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 206. The Court emphasized that a public library is not a
public forum, and Internet services in libraries are not intended to aid in the free expression of
Web providers. Id. Rather, the Internet is a technological extension of the books intended “to
facilitate research, learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials of requisite and
appropriate quality.” Id.
95. Id. at 211–12. The Library Services and Technology Act (LSTA) is one program that
provides public funding. Id. at 211 n.5. LSTA’s goal is to encourage excellence and promote
patrons’ access to library resources. Id. Another program, E-rate, is intended to allow patrons to
access a variety of different resources. Id.
96. Id. at 214.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 209. However, libraries would not unblock a site unless it was for “bona fide
research or other lawful purposes,” even for an adult. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3)
(2000)). The district court viewed this as inadequate because embarrassment could discourage
patrons from doing so. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed with the district court’s finding, stating
that “the Constitution does not guarantee the right to acquire information at a public library
without any risk of embarrassment.” Id.
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was that CIPA, unlike COPA or the CDA, did not criminalize the failure to
follow its guidelines.99 Rather, the Act merely withheld federal funds if its
requirements were not met.100
IV. HEIGHTENED PROTECTION FOR INTERNET SPEECH: RENO AND ASHCROFT
Reno has been called the first decision to “define the legal boundaries of
free expression in the age of the Internet.”101 Although the CDA ultimately
failed, the Court’s decision in Reno led the way for the later creation of
COPA.102 This Section will explain the terms of the CDA and why the Court
found it inconsistent with First Amendment rights. Section B will detail how
Congress remade the CDA and created COPA, in a second attempt to protect
children from harmful Internet speech. Finally, Section C will follow COPA’s
journey through the courts.
A.

The Communications Decency Act: Reno v. ACLU
1.

The CDA

On February 8, 1996, President Clinton signed the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 into effect.103 Although much of the Act was aimed at promoting
competition in the telephone service market, Title V, the CDA, addressed
Congress’s concern with the accessibility of indecent Internet communications
to minors.104 The CDA was enacted without extensive hearings or commission
reports, unlike other portions of the Telecommunications Act.105

99. See Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 212.
100. Id.
101. See JEREMY HARRIS LIPSCHULTZ, FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL BOUNDARIES 98 (2000).
102. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
103. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(h) (2000)); see also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 827 & n.1 (E.D. Pa.
1996).
104. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 826–27.
105. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858 (1997). In a one-day hearing on “Cyberporn and
Children,” Senator Leahy remarked:
It really struck me . . . that it is the first ever hearing . . . . And yet we had a major debate
on the floor, passed legislation overwhelmingly on a subject involving the Internet,
legislation that could dramatically change—some would say even wreak havoc—on the
Internet. The Senate went in willy-nilly, passed legislation, and never once had a hearing,
never once had a discussion other than an hour or so on the floor.
Id. at 858 n.24 (citing Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of the Problem, The State of the
Technology, and the Need for Congressional Action: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 7-8 (1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy, Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary).
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The CDA, in an attempt to protect minors from harmful Internet material,
contained an “indecent transmission” provision and a “patently offensive
display” provision. The indecent transmission provision, contained in §
223(a), prohibited the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages
to a recipient under 18 years of age.106 The patently offensive display
provision, § 223(d), prohibited the knowing sending or displaying of patently
offensive messages so as to make it available to a person under 18 years of
age.107
Under the CDA, Internet speakers that knowingly sent or posted prohibited
material could be fined, imprisoned for up to two years, or both.108 However,
the Act also included two affirmative defenses. If a speaker could prove that
he had taken “good faith, reasonable, effective and appropriate actions under
the circumstances” to keep minors from accessing the communication or that
he required age verification by credit card or an adult verification number
before transmitting offensive material, he could then avoid the CDA’s
penalties.109

106. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2000). The Act provides, in
pertinent part:
(a) Whoever—(1) in interstate or foreign communications . . . (B) by means of a
telecommunications device knowingly—(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and (ii) initiates the
transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the
communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such
communication placed the call or initiated the communication . . . (E) . . . (2) knowingly
permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be used for any activity
prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be
fined . . . or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Id.
107. Id. § 223(d) (2000). This section states:
(d) Whoever—(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly—(A) uses an
interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of
age . . . (B) . . . any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs,
regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the
communication . . . shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Id.
108. Id. § 223 (a), (d).
109. Id. §223 (e). This section provides:
(5) It is a defense . . . that a person—(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective,
and appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to
a communication . . . or (B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring use
of a verified credit card . . . or adult personal identification number.
Id.
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The District Court Considers the CDA

Immediately after President Clinton signed the CDA into effect, twenty
plaintiffs, including non-profit organizations and free speech advocates,
challenged the constitutionality of the Act.110 The Eastern District of
Pennsylvania heard ACLU v. Reno and considered whether to grant the
plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction.111 The court began by making
extensive findings of fact regarding computers, the Internet and the CDA.112
The court found Internet speech to be “as diverse as human thought.”113 On
the Internet, the court found, one can be both a speaker and a member of the
audience, and reach a wide audience at little cost.114 A three-judge panel wrote
three separate opinions and granted the injunction.115
Chief Judge Sloviter subjected the Act to strict scrutiny, likening the
CDA’s regulations to those in telecommunications cases, such as Sable.116 The
judge concluded that the Act “sweeps more broadly than necessary and thereby
chills the expression of adults,” and that the terms “patently offensive” and
“indecent” were inherently vague.117 The judge further found that the CDA’s
affirmative defenses were neither technologically nor economically feasible for
many Internet speakers, and therefore, were not narrowly tailored to meet strict
scrutiny analysis.118 Thus, the CDA was unconstitutional.119
Judge Buckwalter concluded that the terms “patently offensive,”
“indecent,” and “in context” were unconstitutionally vague; thus, the criminal
enforcement of either section would implicate the First and Fifth
Amendments.120 He was particularly troubled by the regulation of indecent
material, as indecency may not be devoid of literary, artistic, political, or

110. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 8227 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Plaintiffs included
organizations such as Stop Prisoner Rape, AIDS Education Global Information System, and
Planned Parenthood Foundation of America, Inc., but no commercial pornographers. Id. at 825–
27 & n.2. A second suit was later filed by twenty-seven additional plaintiffs, including the
American Library Association, Microsoft Corporation, and Health Sciences Libraries
Consortium. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 861–62 & n.28 (1997). Because of the vagueness of
the terms, the CDA could have imposed criminal penalties on these organizations because their
Web-sites contained material that could be considered “indecent” and “patently offensive,” even
though their material is educational or informational in nature. See id. at 870–72.
111. ACLU, 929 F. Supp at 826.
112. Id. at 830–49.
113. Id. at 842.
114. Id. at 842–44.
115. Id. at 826, 849, 857, 865, 883.
116. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 851. See discussion of telecommunications media and indecency
regulation, supra Part II.B.
117. Id. at 854, 858.
118. Id. at 854.
119. Id. at 857.
120. Id. at 858.
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scientific value, unlike obscenity.121 Judge Dalzell, on the other hand, found
that the “special attributes of Internet communication” denied Congress the
power to regulate protected Internet speech.122 Thus, although each judge’s
opinion rested on different grounds, their conclusions were the same: a
resounding “no” to the CDA’s enforcement.
3.

The Supreme Court Hears Reno

Reno reached the Supreme Court on expedited review. 123 The Court, in a
6-3 decision, upheld the district court’s injunction.124 Justice Stevens, writing
for the Court, began his opinion by considering First Amendment cases dealing
with other forms of media and distinguishing them based on both the language
of the CDA and the special characteristics of the Internet.125
The Court first considered Ginsberg v. New York,126 a case that upheld a
statute that prohibited the sale of obscene material to minors.127 The Court
found that the CDA swept much more broadly than the statute in Ginsberg.128
Most importantly, the Court noted that the CDA, unlike the statute in
Ginsberg, was not limited to commercial transactions.129 Further, the CDA
differed from the statute in Ginsberg in that it lacked the “utterly without
redeeming social importance” component of the obscenity definition and failed
to define what constituted prohibited indecent speech.130 Finally, the Court
criticized the fact that the CDA included minors over seventeen years of age
within its protected class.131
The Court went on to reject the government’s contention that Pacifica,132
which gave a lowered First Amendment protection to broadcast media, should

121. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 863.
122. Id. at 877. The characteristics of the Internet, such as its “low barriers to entry,” and
“significant access to all who wish to speak in the medium,” led Judge Dalzell to proclaim that a
proper conclusion may be that “Congress may not regulate indecency on the Internet at all.” Id.
123. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). The district court case was decided on June 11,
1996. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 824. The case was argued before the Supreme Court only nine
months later on March 19, 1997. Reno, 521 U.S. at 844.
124. Reno, 521 U.S. at 848–49.
125. Id. at 849, 864–71.
126. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Ginsberg arose after the owner of a luncheonette and stationary
shop in Bellmore, Long Island, sold a “girlie” magazine to a sixteen-year-old boy. Id. at 631.
The boy’s mother had asked the boy to buy the magazine in order to demonstrate that minors
could purchase such literature from Sam’s. TEDFORD, supra note 33, at 141. The boy’s mother
then turned the shop owner, Sam Ginsberg, over to police. Id.
127. Reno, 521 U.S. at 865.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 865–66.
132. FCC v. Pacifica Found, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). Pacifica is discussed supra Part I.B.
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apply to uphold the CDA.133 The Court distinguished Pacifica on three
grounds. First, the order upheld in Pacifica was made by a regulatory agency
that narrowly targeted its order at a specific broadcast, unlike the CDA’s
“broad categorical prohibitions” that are not “dependent on any evaluation by
an agency familiar with the unique characteristics of the Internet.”134 Second,
the order at issue in Pacifica was not punitive and did not hold the CDA’s
harsh penalties.135 Finally, the Court emphasized that the CDA does not
legislate broadcast media, which has traditionally received the least First
Amendment protection.136 The Court noted that the Internet varied greatly
from other mediums, and found that cases involving other media added
nothing to the analysis of free speech and the Internet.137
The Court then emphasized the vagueness of the CDA and its potential to
chill protected speech.138 Echoing the district court’s findings, Justice Stevens
wrote that the Act’s regulation of “patently offensive material” and “indecent
transmissions” and its failure to define either term rendered the statute
unconstitutionally vague.139 Further, “with penalties including up to two years
in prison for each act of violation, [t]he severity of criminal sanctions may well
cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate.”140 Justice Stevens
emphasized the unique nature of the Internet, and stated that “any person with
a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it
could from any soapbox.”141 Thus, the CDA’s ambiguous standards, in
combination with its harsh criminal penalties presented “a great[] threat of
censoring speech” in this expansive new medium.142
The Court further held that the CDA was overbroad,143 likening the Act’s
blanket restrictions to those held unconstitutional in Sable.144 The Court wrote
that, “[g]iven the size of the potential audience for most messages, in the
absence of a viable age verification process, the sender must be charged with
knowing that one or more minors will likely view it.”145 The Court continued:
“Knowledge that, for instance, one or more members of a 100-person chat
group will be a minor—and therefore that it would be a crime to send the
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
Id.
144.
145.

Reno, 521 U.S. at 866–67.
Id. at 867.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 873–74.
Id. at 873.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 870.
Id. at 874.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 877. “The breadth of the CDA’s coverage is wholly unprecedented.”
Id. at 875.
Id. at 876.
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group an indecent message—would surely burden communication among
adults.”146 Without technology to allow adults, but not minors, to access such
messages, the CDA’s burden was too heavy. Moreover, the CDA’s broad
scope would criminalize indecent speech that is protected for adults, such as
discussions regarding sexually transmitted diseases, prison rape, abortion,147
and other valuable but indecent Internet speech, whether commercial or
otherwise.
The Court further concluded that the Act was not narrowly tailored to meet
the government’s interest.148 Plaintiffs maintained that filtering software or
tagging would allow parents to control the Internet materials that their children
could access. 149 Moreover, the age verification and adult identification
numbers that constitute an affirmative defense to the CDA would not be
economically feasible for most noncommercial speakers and would not prevent
minors from posing as adults.150 The Court ultimately found that the CDA
placed an unreasonable burden on speech, and that its affirmative defenses
were not narrowly tailored to save the “otherwise patently invalid
unconstitutional provision.”151
B.

The Child Online Protection Act: Ashcroft v. ACLU
1.

The CDA Becomes COPA

The Supreme Court declared the CDA unconstitutional on June 26,
1997.152 Within five months, a determined Congress began considering
proposals for a new Internet protection bill.153 This time Congress carefully

146. Id.
147. Id. at 874–75, 878. “In evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have made it
perfectly clear that ‘[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First
Amendment.’” Id. (quoting Sable Commc’n of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
148. Reno, 521 U.S. at 879.
149. Id. at 881. “Tagging” refers to the requirement that an Internet speaker electronically
designate his or her speech as indecent, thus allowing screening software to detect and block the
material. Id. The government argued that tagging would constitute “good faith, reasonable,
effective, and appropriate actions” under the affirmative defense portion of the act. Id. This did
not save the CDA, however, as screening software did not exist at the time of trial, nor was it
shown that such software would be effective if it did exist. Id.
150. Id. at 881–82.
151. Id. at 882. The Court remarked that the CDA’s overbreadth and restriction on adult
speech to protect minors amounted to “burn[ing] the house to roast the pig.” Id. (quoting Sable
Commc’n of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989)). In response to the Court’s decision, U.S.
Sen. Patrick Leahy has remarked: “The Supreme Court has made clear that we do not forfeit our
First Amendment rights when we go online. This decision is a landmark in the history of the
Internet and a firm foundation for its future growth.” LIPSCHULTZ, supra note 101, at 98.
152. Reno, 521 U.S. at 844.
153. Wilt, supra note 59, at 378.
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aligned its legislation with the Reno decision.154 The Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation conducted two hearings on harmful
Internet materials, to some extent in response to the Court’s criticism for its
failure to do so before passing the CDA.155 A new bill made its way through
Congress.156 Within the year, President Clinton signed the Child Online
Protection Act into law.157
COPA imposed as much as $50,000 in fines and six months in prison on
Web publishers who knowingly posted Internet material that was both harmful
to minors and posted for commercial purposes.158 COPA borrowed its
definition of “material that is harmful to minors” from Miller’s three-prong
obscenity test:
The term “material that is harmful to minors” means any communication . . .
that is obscene or that—
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is
designed to appeal to . . . the prurient interest;
(B) depicts . . . in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an
actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal
or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent
female breast; and

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 379.
158. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a) (2000). The Act states:
(1) Prohibited conduct
Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in
interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web, makes any
communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that includes
any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned
not more than 6 months, or both.
(2) Intentional violations
In addition to the penalties under paragraph (1), whoever intentionally violates such
paragraph shall be subject to a fine of not more than $50,000 for each violation. . . .
(3) Civil penalty
In addition to the penalties under paragraphs (1) and (2), whoever violates paragraph
(1) shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each violation. . . .
Id. A person acts for commercial purposes only if “such person is engaged in the business of
making such communications.” § 231(e)(2)(A). “Engaged in business” means that “the person
who makes a communication, or offers to make a communication, by means of the World Wide
Web, that includes any material that is harmful to minors, devotes time, attention, or labor to such
activities, as a regular course of such person’s trade or business, with the objective of earning a
profit as a result of such activities.” § 231(e)(2)(B).
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(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value for minors.159

COPA, like the CDA, set forth affirmative defenses.160 Under the Act, a
Web publisher that required a credit card or other adult verification before
granting access to the site or used other reasonable means to verify a user’s age
would escape COPA’s criminal and civil penalties.161
At first glance, COPA and the CDA appear similar. Both regulate indecent
materials on the Internet, stiffly penalize those who violate their regulations
and provide some speakers with an affirmative defense.162 However, Congress
made three important changes when it reinvented the CDA. First, it limited
COPA to commercial speech.163 In Reno, the Court repeatedly suggested that
regulation of commercial Web sites would pass First Amendment scrutiny.164
In finding the CDA unconstitutional, the majority distinguished the Act from
Ginsberg based, in part, on the fact that the Act upheld in Ginsberg regulated
only commercial entities.165 In Reno, the Court also discussed the effects of
forcing non-commercial Web publishers to require a credit card or password
before allowing entry onto their sites due to the cost of doing so.166 The Court
stated that such an imposition on non-commercial sites would impose
substantial costs on such Web sites and would require many to shut down.167 It
seemed the Court would hold regulations of commercial sites to a lower
standard.
Secondly, COPA applied only to materials displayed on the World Wide
Web, and exempted material found in e-mails and chatrooms.168 The CDA
was extremely broad in that it regulated all Internet speech.169 The Court in
Reno was particularly concerned that speakers would be unable to verify the
ages of those that received messages in chat rooms and other open Internet

159. § 231(e)(6); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 14, 24–25 (1973).
160. COPA provides the following affirmative defenses:
It is an affirmative defense . . . that the defendant, in good faith, has restricted access by minors to
material that is harmful to minors—
(A) by requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal
identification number;
(B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or
(C) by any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available technology.
§ 231(c)(1).
161. See §§ 231 (COPA), 223 (CDA).
162. § 231.
163. §§ 231(a)(1), 223(a).
164. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877 (1997).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 856.
167. Id.
168. See § 231(a).
169. See § 223(a).
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forums.170 A speaker’s knowledge that “one or more members of a 100-person
chat group will be a minor” would make that speaker liable under the CDA for
an indecent message he or she sends.171 The district court had previously
determined that there “is no effective way to determine the identity or the age
of a user who is accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups
or chat rooms.”172 Thus, the CDA would chill such indecent speech that is
protected as to adults.173 COPA remedied this problem. Through commonly
used technology, Web publishers would be able to require age verification or
passwords before allowing entry onto their Web sites.174
Finally, Congress changed the CDA’s language. The CDA regulated
“indecent” and “patently offensive” material.175 The CDA did not define
either term, which created unconstitutional vagueness that could chill
speech.176 In COPA, Congress changed the Act to target “material that is
harmful to minors,”177 and defined the phrase using Miller’s obscenity
standard.178 Material that is obscene under Miller’s three-prong test receives
no constitutional protection. Although Congress believed it was merely
regulating unprotected obscenity, the courts disagreed.
2.

COPA Meets the Courts

Much to the chagrin of its supporters, but to no one’s surprise, COPA’s
beginnings mirrored those of the CDA.179 On October 22, 1998, just one day
after President Clinton signed COPA into law, seventeen plaintiffs filed suit in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.180 The

170.
171.
172.
173.

Reno, 521 U.S. at 876.
Id.
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
Reno, 521 U.S. at 877; see also 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH §14:66 (2005).
174. See § 223(c).
175. § 223(a), (d).
176. “‘Indecent’ does not benefit from any textual embellishment at all. ‘Patently offensive’
is qualified only to the extent that it involves ‘sexual or excretory activities or organs’ taken ‘in
context’ and ‘measured by temporary community standards.’” Reno, 521 U.S. at 871 n.35. In
Reno, the Court distinguished the statute that was found constitutional in Ginsberg based on the
statute’s narrow definition of “indecent” to include only materials that are harmful to minors and
“utterly without redeeming social importance.” Id. at 865–66.
177. 47 U.S.C. §§ 231(a)(1), (e)(6).
178. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
179. “The pattern of Congress passing legislation and then it being instantly challenged has
been repeated over and over again during the past seven years.” Susan Hanley Kosse, Try, Try
Again: Will Congress Ever Get it Right? A Summary of Internet Pornography Laws Protecting
Children and Possible Solutions, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 721, 723 (2004).
180. Wilt, supra note 59, at 395.
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plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Act and
under the First and Fifth Amendments.181
After five days of testimony, the court rendered sixty-seven separate
findings of fact relating to the Internet, COPA, and the Web.182 Among its
most important findings was that once material is posted on the Web, the
speaker cannot prevent the speech from going to a particular geographic
area.183 The court also found that “age verification screens,” a possible
affirmative defense to COPA’s penalties, could potentially cost Web
publishers thousands of dollars to implement.184 COPA’s other defense, adult
age verification, would require an Internet user to pay a yearly fee in order to
obtain an Adult Check PIN.185
In an opinion authored by Judge Reed, the court found that COPA must be
subjected to strict scrutiny analysis, as it was a content-based regulation.186
The Court noted that “[a]lthough there are lower standards of scrutiny where
the regulation of general broadcast media or ‘commercial’ speech . . . are
involved, neither is appropriate here.”187 It rejected the government’s
argument that the lowered scrutiny applied to the broadcast medium should be
applied to internet speech.188 Thus, the court determined that COPA must: 1)
serve a compelling government interest; 2) be narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest; and 3) be the least restrictive means of advancing that interest.189
Although the court found that protecting children is a compelling
government interest,190 it found that COPA was not narrowly tailored for two
reasons. First, COPA was not likely to meet the “least restrictive means”
test.191 Although imperfect, blocking and filtering technology could block
material from other countries and material in emails and chatrooms without
181. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 477 (1999) [hereinafter COPA I]. Plaintiffs
advanced three claims: (1) that COPA was invalid on its face and as applied to them under the
First Amendment due to its burden on constitutionally protected adult speech; (2) that COPA
violated the rights of minors; and (3) that COPA was unconstitutionally vague under the First and
Fifth Amendments. Id.
182. Id. at 477, 481–92.
183. Id. at 484.
184. Id. at 488.
185. Id. at 489–90. Approximately twenty-five services on the Web provided such adult PIN
services at the time the district court heard the evidence. Id. at 489.
186. COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 493. Content-based regulations of speech are presumptively
invalid and subject to strict scrutiny. Id. The Court wrote, “As a matter of constitutional
tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of
the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage
it.” Id. (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997)).
187. Id. at 492–93.
188. Id. at 493.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 495.
191. COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 496–97.
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burdening adult speech.192 COPA, on the other hand, would have left these
materials untouched.193 There was also evidence that minors could have the
ability to legitimately possess credit or debit cards that would allow them to
access harmful materials despite COPA’s screening mechanisms.194 Thus, the
court found filtering and blocking software to be a less restrictive and more
effective alternative to protect minors.195
Second, the court found COPA overbroad and noted the “sweeping . . .
COPA prohibited “any
forms of content” that COPA restricted.196
communication, picture, image, graphic image file . . . writing, or any other
matter of any kind.”197 The court recommended that Congress limit its
restrictions to cover only pictures, images, or graphic image files.198 The court
went on to suggest other changes Congress might make to create a
constitutional statute. Bothered by COPA’s harsh penalties, the court
suggested that Congress employ lesser sanctions or incorporate COPA’s
affirmative defenses into the elements of the crime itself.199 The court
concluded that the Act was not narrowly tailored and was unconstitutionally
overbroad.200 The district court granted the preliminary injunction, holding
that plaintiffs would likely succeed on the merits.201
3.

COPA Is Appealed to the Third Circuit

On appeal, Judge Garth, writing for the Third Circuit, affirmed the
injunction on different grounds.202 Rather than relying on the district court’s
finding that COPA was not narrowly tailored, the court considered COPA’s
“contemporary community standards” criterion of judging whether materials
are harmful to minors.203 Although the use of a community standards
evaluation had been upheld in the analysis of other media,204 the court found
this standard troublesome in the context of the Internet.205
The district court had found that the Internet, unlike broadcast, telephone,
and cable media, does not allow the speaker to control the dissemination of his
192. Id. at 497.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 496–97.
195. Id. at 497.
196. COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
202. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 165–66 (3d Cir. 2000) [hereinafter COPA II].
203. Id. at 166.
204. Id. at 175 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974); Sable Commc’n of
Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125–26 (1989)).
205. COPA II, 217 F.3d at 166.
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material.206 Since a Web publisher’s speech is available to everyone with an
Internet connection, and there exists no geographical “community” for Internet
speech, the Third Circuit reasoned that Web publishers would have to abide by
the “standards of the community most likely to be offended by the
message.”207 Based on this sole provision of the statute, and without
addressing the district court’s holding, the Third Circuit found COPA
unconstitutionally overbroad.208
4.

COPA’s First Trip to the Supreme Court

The government appealed the Third Circuit’s narrow holding—that
COPA’s
contemporary
“community
standards”
criterion
was
unconstitutionally overbroad—to the Supreme Court.209 In an 8-to-1 decision
authored by Justice Thomas, the Court vacated and remanded the Third
Circuit’s ruling.210 After reviewing the Reno decision and the two prior
decisions in this case, the Court held that the “reliance on community standards
to identify ‘material that is harmful to minors’ does not by itself render the
statue substantially overbroad for purposes of the First Amendment.”211 The
Court stressed that “community standards need not be defined by reference to a
precise geographic area.”212 Rather, jurors could judge whether material is
harmful to minors based on their personal knowledge.213
Although the members of the Court overwhelmingly agreed with COPA
II’s holding, they produced several opinions,214 foreshadowing that COPA had
not yet overcome the last of its obstacles. The Court stressed that it would not
206. COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
Web publishers cannot restrict access to their site based on the geographic locale of the
Internet user visiting their site. In fact, “an Internet user cannot foreclose access to . . .
work from certain states or send differing versions of . . . communication[s] to different
jurisdictions . . . The Internet user has no ability to bypass any particular state.”
COPA II, 217 F.3d at 176 (quoting Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y.
1997)).
207. Id. at 177 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877–78 (1997)).
208. Id. at 178–81. Although the court affirmed the preliminary injunction, it did so
reluctantly. The Third Circuit quoted the Supreme Court’s Reno opinion: “[S]ometimes we must
make decisions that we do not like. We make them because they are right, right in the sense that
the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result.” Id. at 181 (quoting Reno v.
ACLU, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 498 (1999)). The Third Circuit further expressed its confidence that
developing technology would “soon render the community standards challenge moot.” Id.
209. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) [hereinafter COPA III].
210. Id. at 566, 586.
211. Id. at 585.
212. Id. at 576.
213. Id. at 576–77 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974)).
214. Justices O’Connor and Breyer filed separate opinions and concurred in the judgment. Id.
at 586–91. Justice Kennedy entered another concurring opinion, joined by Justices Souter and
Ginsberg. Id. at 591–602. Justice Stevens entered a dissenting opinion. Id. at 602–12.
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consider whether COPA would pass constitutional scrutiny in other respects
and would not address issues raised by the district court.215 The Court vacated
the Third Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings,
while upholding the preliminary injunction.216
5.

Back to the Third Circuit

On remand, the Third Circuit reconsidered the district court’s grant of a
preliminary injunction, this time in light of the many opinions authored by the
Supreme Court.217 In subjecting COPA to strict scrutiny, the court found that
the government did have a compelling interest in protecting children; however,
COPA’s provisions were not narrowly tailored to meet this goal. 218 The court
took issue with three provisions of COPA.219
COPA’s regulations targeted material designed to appeal to the prurient
interests of minors, a judgment left to “the average person, applying
contemporary community standards” and “taking the material as a whole.”220
Under the First Amendment, all speech must be evaluated in context, rather
than in isolation, to determine the level of protection it should receive.221
Otherwise, a mere photograph in a book or scene in a movie could render an
entire work obscene.222 For this reason, the court found COPA’s plain terms
troublesome.223 As the court noted, COPA regulates “any communication,
picture, image file . . . or other matter of any kind,” that appeals to the prurient
interest of minors, making it difficult to apply the “as a whole” standard.224
Under COPA’s plain terms, each individual communication or image would be
considered “a whole” by itself.225
The court next found the term “minor,” defined in the statute as “any
person under 17 years of age,” troublesome. 226 Because “minor” could cover
persons from infancy to age seventeen, Web publishers would not know what

215. COPA III, 535 U.S. at 585–86.
216. Id.
217. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 2003) [hereinafter COPA IV].
218. Id. at 251.
219. Id.
220. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (e)(6) (2000) (emphasis added).
221. COPA IV, 322 F.3d at 252.
222. See generally id.
223. Id. at 252–53.
224. Id. at 252. “It is unclear whether what is to be judged as a whole is a single image on a
Web page, a whole Web page, an entire multipage Web site, or an interlocking set of Web sites.”
Id. (quoting COPA III, 535 U.S. 564, 593 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
225. Id. at 253. The court gave the example of a sexual image within a collection of art. Id.
Although such an image could be deemed harmful by itself, it might not “appeal to the prurient
interest” if viewed in the context of an art collection. Id.
226. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(7) (2000); COPA IV, 322 F.3d at 253–54.
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standards their material must meet.227 The court wrote that “materials that
have ‘serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value’ for a sixteen-yearold [do not] have the same value for a minor who is three years old.”228
Moreover, since the Act covered such a wide age range, it would regulate a
great deal of protected Internet speech.229 In this respect, too, COPA was not
narrowly tailored so as to survive strict scrutiny.230
Additionally, the court found that COPA’s limited coverage of commercial
speech still did not sufficiently limit COPA’s scope.231 The Act’s expansive
definition of “engaged in the business,” covered “any person whose
communication ‘includes any material that is harmful to minors’ and who
devotes time . . . to such activities as a regular course of such person’s trade or
business, with the objective of earning a profit.”232 Thus, the Act would apply
to commercial pornographers as well as those who merely sell goods or
services on the Web or simply seek to earn revenue from Internet traffic, as
long as some part of their Web-site contains harmful material.233
Finally, the court found that COPA’s affirmative defenses were not
sufficiently narrowed.234 To avoid penalty under COPA, Web-publishers must
require age verification or employ other reasonable measures to ensure that
minors do not gain access to their harmful material.235 However, the court
feared that age verification screens would cause Web-publishers to lose some
adult users and otherwise burden speech.236 Further, affirmative defenses do
not prevent prosecution, and they leave the burden of proof with the speaker.237
Filtering and other technological means would prevent minors from accessing
sites harmful to them without burdening protected adult speech.238
The court did not stop with holding that COPA was not narrowly tailored
to meet the government’s interest of protecting minors. Mirroring the district

227. COPA IV, 322 F.3d at 254.
228. Id. at 253–54.
229. See id. at 258–61.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 256.
232. COPA IV, 322 F.3d at 256 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(B) (2000)).
233. Id. The court pointed to the district court’s finding that approximately one-third of all
Web-sites could be included in COPA’s expansive definition of “commercial purposes.” Id. at
257.
234. Id. at 259.
235. § 231(c)(1).
236. COPA IV, 322 F.3d at 259. In particular, the court expressed its fear that adults would
be unwilling to provide personal information, such as a credit card number, especially if the
material they wish to access is sensitive or controversial. Id. The founder of PlanetOut, a gay
and lesbian Web-site, stated that many people would stop using the site if users were forced to
identify themselves. Adam Cohen, Cyberspeech on Trial, TIME, Feb. 15, 1999, at 52.
237. COPA IV, 322 F.3d at 260.
238. Id.
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court’s opinion, the court found blocking and filtering technology to be a lessrestrictive way to protect children from harmful Internet material.239 The court
concluded by going beyond the issues it was handed by the Supreme Court and
the district court, perhaps in attempt to remedy the narrowness of its first
opinion.240 The court held that COPA was overbroad, relying on the same
provisions that led to its finding that COPA was not narrowly tailored: the
inability to evaluate prohibited material “as a whole,” the Act’s broad
definition of both “minor” and “commercial purposes,” and the chilling effect
of its affirmative defenses.241 The court again wrote that the “community
standards” provision rendered COPA overbroad.242 Thus, the court found that
COPA was not narrowly tailored, did not represent the least restrictive means
available, and was unconstitutionally overbroad.243 The Third Circuit upheld
the injunction a second time.244
6.

The Court Hears COPA V

a.

A Divided Court

Again, the government appealed the Third Circuit’s decision.245 And, for
the second time, the Supreme Court considered whether COPA violated the
First Amendment protections provided to Internet speech.246 On June 29,
2004, in a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that COPA was not the least
restrictive means available to meet the government’s interest.247 Justice
Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter,
Thomas and Ginsburg.248
The Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis, again giving the government
the burden to prove that the Act was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
government interest and that the Act was the least restrictive means
available.249 The Court first examined whether COPA had employed the least
restrictive available alternative to regulate harmful Internet speech.250 The
Court noted that the district court had found blocking and filtering technology
239. Id. at 265.
240. Id. at 266–70.
241. Id.
242. COPA IV, 322 F.3d at 270.
243. Id. at 251, 265–66.
244. Id. at 271.
245. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) [hereinafter COPA V].
246. Id. at 659.
247. Id. at 672.
248. Id. at 658.
249. Id. at 672 (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)). The majority
emphasized that content-based prohibitions have “the potential to be a repressive force in the
lives and thoughts of a free people.” Id.
250. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 666.
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to be a less restrictive, more effective means of protecting children.251 The
Court noted the flaws with COPA in comparison to filtering technology: filters
can block most harmful materials from children, where COPA would only be
able to enforce its restrictions in the United States; COPA’s age verification
screens could be circumvented by some minors; COPA could encourage U.S.
providers to relocate overseas; and filters can apply to all Internet materials,
including e-mail, rather than merely protecting children from harmful materials
found on Web-sites.252 Most importantly, filtering technology would not
burden adult speech.253
The Court further considered the findings of the Commission on Child
Online Protection, which Congress itself created.254 The Commission, too, had
found filtering technology more effective than age-verification
requirements.255 Although filtering technology has flaws, such as allowing
some explicit material to reach the user and blocking out material that has
educational value, the Court found that the government failed its burden to
show that such technology was, in fact, less effective than COPA.256 The
government argued that Congress cannot require Internet users to implement
filtering technology; however, the Supreme Court disagreed.257 The Court
stated that it had “held that Congress can give strong incentives to schools and
libraries to use [filtering technology].”258 Thus, Congress may also give
incentives for development of filtering technology and incentives for
consumers to implement filtering technology at home.259 The Court found that
filtering technology was a not only a less restrictive alternative to COPA, but a
more effective alternative.260
Beside the existence of a more effective, less restrictive alternative to
COPA, the Court found other problems with the Act. As in Reno, the Court
expressed a concern that COPA’s penalties could chill protected speech.261
Even where an Internet site requires the user to verify his majority age, the
harmful materials on the Web site could still subject the Web publisher to
251. Id. at 666–68.
252. Id. at 668.
253. Id. The Court stated that, using filtering technology, adults could access Internet speech
without identifying themselves or providing credit card information. Id. Moreover, promoting
filters does not condemn speech. Id.
254. Id.
255. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 668. The Court noted that the COPA Commission’s report
assigned a “score for ‘Effectiveness’ of 7.4 for server-based filters and 6.5 for client-based filters,
as compared to 5.9 for independent adult-id verification, and 5.5 for credit card verification.” Id.
256. Id. at 669.
257. Id.
258. Id. (citing United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003)).
259. Id.
260. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 667.
261. Id. at 671.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

984

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:957

prosecution.262 Thus, the Web publisher could be subject to prosecution
despite his compliance with the Act, with only an affirmative defense for
protection.263 The Court emphasized that “[w]here a prosecution is a likely
possibility, yet only an affirmative defense is available, speakers may selfcensor rather than risk the perils of trial. There is a potential for extraordinary
harm and a serious chill upon protected speech.”264
Finally, the Court noted that factual questions still linger in the case. The
Court stated that because the case had been twice appealed to the Supreme
Court, the parties had not presented new factual findings for almost five
years265—an eternity in Internet years. The Court wrote that it had to let the
decision stand because the government had not met its burden, but that new
facts could change this.266 Thus, the Court sent COPA all the way back to the
drawing board—for a full trial in Philadelphia—leaving COPA’s fate uncertain
for yet a few more years.267 In conclusion, the Court held out some hope to
COPA supporters, emphasizing that its decision did “not hold that Congress is
incapable of enacting any regulation of the Internet designed to prevent minors
from gaining access to harmful materials.”268
b.

Justice Stevens Concurs in the Opinion

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsberg, concurred in the opinion.269
Stevens again found COPA unconstitutional based on the statute’s
“contemporary community standards” criterion, which was used to determine
whether material is harmful in violation of the Act.270 In Ashcroft’s first visit
to the Supreme Court, Stevens expressed the same opinion in his dissent,
stating that “in the context of the Internet, . . . community standards become a
sword rather than a shield. If a prurient appeal is offensive in a puritan village,
it may be a crime to post it on the World Wide Web.”271
However, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority’s finding that filtering
and blocking software acted as a less restrictive alternative to COPA.272 In
262. See id.; 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1) (2000).
263. See COPA V, 542 U.S. at 670.
264. Id.
265. Id. To demonstrate the need for new factual findings, the Court looked to statistics given
by the Internet Systems Consortium, which state that the number of Interest hosts increased from
36.7 million hosts as of July 1998 to approximately 233.1 million hosts as of January 2004. Id.
(citing Internet Systems Consortium, ISC Internet Domain Survey, Jan. 2004, http://www.isc.og/
index.pl?/ops/ds)
266. Id. at 672.
267. Id.
268. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 672.
269. Id. at 673.
270. Id.
271. Id. (quoting COPA III, 535 U.S. 564, 603 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
272. Id. at 674.
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particular, he emphasized the harshness of COPA’s penalties, writing that
“[c]riminal prosecutions are . . . an inappropriate means to regulate the
universe of materials classified as ‘obscene’ since ‘the line between
communications which “offend” and those which do not is too blurred to
identify criminal conduct.’”273 Justice Stevens emphasized that COPA’s
penalties were “strong medicine” when filtering technology or plain, oldfashioned adult supervision could both protect children and leave Internet
speech unburdened.274
c.

Justices Scalia and Breyer Dissent

In his brief dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the majority erred in
subjecting COPA to the strict scrutiny test.275 After examining past Supreme
Court decisions, Scalia emphasized that commercial entities that “deliberately
emphasiz[e] the sexually provocative aspects” of their products “engage in
constitutionally unprotected behavior.”276 Scalia wrote that the entire business
of selling pornography on the Internet could be banned in a manner consistent
with the First Amendment.277
Justice Breyer filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor joined.278 Breyer agreed that the Act should
be subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis, but did not believe that Congress’s
objectives could be accomplished through other, less restrictive means.279
Breyer noted the similarities between Miller’s obscenity definition and the
very material COPA sought to regulate,280 and emphasized that the Act
primarily covered materials that receive no First Amendment protection.281
Because speech that would appeal to the prurient interest of minors would
likely appeal to the prurient interest of adults, COPA does not burden protected
speech.282 Thus, COPA presents no First Amendment problem.283

273. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 674–75 (quoting Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 316
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
274. Id. at 675.
275. Id. at 676 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
276. Id. (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 831 (2000) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
277. Id.
278. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 676.
279. Id. at 677.
280. Id. at 678. Breyer emphasized that speech that appeals to the prurient interest and speech
devoid of serious literary artistic, political, or scientific value is the only speech that falls within
COPA’s prohibitions. Id. at 679. These elements match Miller’s definition of legally obscene;
thus, almost all of the speech COPA regulates would be speech that already receives no First
Amendment protection. Id.
281. Id. at 679–80.
282. Id. Justice Breyer listed examples of speech that, he thought, would not be subject to
COPA’s penalties, including discussions on sexually transmitted diseases, birth control and
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Second, Justice Breyer emphasized that the Act does not censor speech,
“[r]ather, it requires providers of the ‘harmful to minors’ material to restrict
minors’ access to it by verifying age.”284 Breyer wrote that the cost of
implementing an age verification screen is minimal and that many commercial
Web-sites already require such age verification.285 Breyer also pointed out that
other burdens that could stop Internet users from visiting harmful Web-sites,
such as embarrassment, did not automatically deem a regulation
unconstitutional.286
Justice Breyer then examined the Court’s finding that the Act failed to
employ the least restrictive means available to advance the government’s
interest. Breyer wrote that blocking and filtering technology existed when
COPA was created, and that COPA was Congress’s attempt to provide
protection beyond filtering.287 Thus, the majority, by finding that filtering
technology was a less restrictive alterative, was simply holding that it was less
restrictive to do nothing.288 Breyer then emphasized the deficiencies of filters.
He noted the district court’s finding that filters can both under-block and overblock Internet material.289 He further noted that filters can be costly, and
parents maintain the responsibility of installing the technology.290 This
information, Breyer opined, could lead Congress to the reasonable conclusion
that blocking and filtering software is not an effective solution.291 Breyer
concluded that the Act, properly interpreted, “risks imposition of minor

homosexuality, and postings of literary works. Id. at 680. He emphasized that such works are
“not both (1) ‘designed to appeal to . . . the prurient interest’ . . . and (2) lacking in ‘serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.’” Id. at 681. Thus, such material would remain
unregulated. Id.
283. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 681–82. Later in his dissent, Breyer states that “[the Court] could
construe the statute narrowly—as I have tried to do—removing nearly all protected material from
its scope. By doing so, we could reconcile its language with the First Amendment’s demands.”
Id. at 690–91.
284. Id. at 682.
285. Id. at 682–83.
286. Id. Breyer quoted the Court’s plurality opinion in United States v. American Library
Ass’n, Inc., stating that “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee the right to acquire information at a
public library without any risk of embarrassment.” Id. at 683 (quoting United States v. Am.
Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 209 (2003)).
287. Id. at 683–87.
288. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 683–84.
289. Id. at 684–86.
290. Id. at 685. Breyer further states:
More than 28 million school age children have both parents or their sole parent in the
work force, at least 5 million children are left alone at home without supervision each
week, and many of those children will spend afternoons and evenings with friends who
may well have access to computers and more lenient parents.
Id.
291. Id. at 686.
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burdens on some protected material—burdens that adults wishing to view the
material may overcome at modest cost,”292 while achieving Congress’s goal of
protecting children.293 In Breyer’s view, the Act was constitutional.294
Finally, Justice Breyer reacted to the Court’s remand of the case for further
findings. Breyer pointed out that neither side had asked to present further
evidence, and that it was anybody’s guess what either party could add to the
matter.295 Furthermore, he wrote that there was nothing more Congress could
do to regulate the Internet, given the Court’s decision in this case. 296 He
criticized the majority, stating that if the Court was taking the position that the
Internet cannot be legislated, or that criminal penalties cannot be employed to
regulate the Internet, then it should state so clearly rather than sending the case
back to the district court.297
VI. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO MEET CONGRESS’S GOAL
Congress and many Americans believe there is an urgent need to protect
children from Internet pornography, and for good reason.298 The business of
Internet pornography has flourished in the past few years, and today it accounts
for two-thirds of all Internet-generated revenue.299 The growth of this now
$2.5 billion dollar industry has sparked Rep. Michael Oxley, COPA’s coauthor, and the Bush administration to proclaim that this will not be the end of
their attempt to defend COPA and to regulate the Internet.300 In fact, as
recently as July of 2005, both the House and the Senate have entertained new
bills to protect children from Internet pornography.301
292. Id. at 689.
293. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 689.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 689–90.
297. Id. at 689–91.
298. Morality in Media, Inc., Americans Still Want Federal Obscenity Laws Enforced Against
Hardcore Internet Pornography, According to Poll Results, Mar. 18, 2004,
http://www.moralityinmedia.org/obscenityEnforcement/Wirthlin2004.htm.
According to its
study, Morality in Media, Inc. reports that some eighty-two percent of adult Americans surveyed
in March 2004 said that “federal laws against Internet obscenity should be vigorously enforced.”
Id.
299. Declan McCullagh, Supreme Court Keeps Net Porn Law on Ice, http://ecousticscnet.com.com/Supreme+Court+keeps+Net+porn+law+on+ice/2100-1028_3-5251475.html (last
updated June 29, 2004).
300. Id. Rep. Michael Oxley promised that “[t]he fight for COPA and our children is not
over. I will contact the Department of Justice and ask it to mount an aggressive case to show the
court that there is technology to make COPA work . . . .” Oxley Reacts to Supreme Court Ruling
on COPA, June 29, 2004, http://oxley.house.gov/news.asp?FormMode=Detail&ID=378.
301. See S. 1507, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3479, 109th Cong. (2005). These identical bills
refer to the new proposed legislation as the “Internet Safety and Child Protection Act of 2005.”
S. 1507 § 1; H.R. 3479 § 1. The proposed Act’s most notable changes are its regulation of
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The Court, too, is interested in protecting children from the Internet
pornography boom. In Reno, the Court made several suggestions as to how
Congress could create constitutional legislation.302 In COPA V the majority
assured COPA supporters that it did “not hold that Congress is incapable of
enacting any regulation of the Internet designed to prevent minors from
gaining access to harmful materials.”303 However, despite public outcry and
the Court’s mixed messages, drafting constitutionally sound legislation has
proved exceedingly difficult. Below, Part A will analyze a proposed COPAlike regulation based on the Court’s decisions in Reno and Ashcroft, and
determine whether it could pass judicial scrutiny. Part B will consider nonlegislative measures that have already been employed to protect children, as
well as other means that may enable Congress to reach its goal.
A.

Creating a New Regulation
1.

Creating a Constitutional COPA

The Internet has been referred to as a forum that allows the voice to
resonate “farther than it could from any soapbox”304 and that allows “a true
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development,
and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”305 These unique qualities
necessitate heightened First Amendment protection for speech in this medium.
To their demise, both the CDA and COPA impinged on Internet speech by
regulating not only obscene material, but also material that is protected as to
adults, and other valuable speech. A look at the plaintiffs in both Reno and
Ashcroft demonstrates the great burdens these statutes imposed. Founders of
Web-sites devoted to teaching doctors, promoting AIDS awareness, and
speaking out against rape were among those that objected to COPA’s
enactment.306 As the courts have emphasized, for Internet regulations to pass
constitutional muster, these speakers must remain untouched.307

“pornographic materials” and the change in the definition of “minor” from age seventeen to age
eighteen. S. 1507 § 101; H.R. 3479 § 101. Additionally, the Act places a burden on banks, credit
card companies, and anyone else that performs financial transactions related to Internet
pornography to ensure that only age-verified transactions are processed. S. 1507 § 102; H.R.
3479 § 102. The proposed Act requires “regulated pornographic Web site[s]” to use agescreening software and imposes a twenty-five percent tax on the amount the Internet provider
charges to those that view its pornographic materials. S. 1507 § 201; H.R. 3479 § 201.
302. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 876–78 (1997).
303. COPA V, 542 U.S. 656, 672 (2004).
304. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
305. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 563, 566 (2002) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (Supp. V
1994)).
306. Id. at 571 n.4.
307. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
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Congress acted quickly when it formulated the CDA, and later COPA. In
its haste, Congress put restrictions on Internet speech that were more
“sweeping” 308 than it had ever intended.309 In actuality, Congress’s goal in
creating both Acts was merely to eliminate “teaser ads” from the Internet—free
pornographic images offered by some commercial pornography sites to induce
Internet users to enter the next screen and then pay to enter the site.310 What
Congress drafted, however, were statutes with “unprecedented”311 scope, too
broad to survive First Amendment scrutiny.
COPA V and Reno teach an important lesson: for Congress to draft
constitutional legislation, it must not burden protected Internet speech.
Congress must carefully define the terms and phrases of its regulation and
avoid imposing heavy sanctions that could chill free speech. Additionally,
Internet speakers should have more than an affirmative defense for protection.
Thus, very narrow legislation that targets only obscene teaser ads that
appear before a credit card screen could pass judicial scrutiny. Such legislation
would greatly narrow COPA’s scope and repair its many flaws. The
legislation would not require Web publishers to implement expensive age
verification screens. Adults that utilize these sites would not bear the burden
of disclosing additional personal information, and Web-sites would not lose
business—only sites that already require credit cards would be affected.312
Further, only sites that are “commercial” in the sense Congress intended—sites
that profit from the obscene material itself—would be subject to penalty. The
result of this statutory language would be simply that obscene Web-sites with
teaser ads would be required to remove or alter their ads.

308. COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 497 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
309. “In response to public outcry that the Internet was becoming a dangerous place for our
country’s youth, Congress ignored constitutional precedent and created the most politically
expedient solution in each legislative attempt.” Robert K. Magovern, The Expert Agency and the
Public Interest: Why the Department of Justice Should Leave Online Obscenity to the FCC, 11
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 327, 340 (2003).
310. Cohen, supra note 236. The district court noted in its decision that the measure would
curb not only teaser ads, but a wide range of more useful speech. See COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at
497. In oral arguments before the Supreme Court, petitioner’s counsel stated:
[m]aterial which is obscene is usually kept behind [an age verification screen] . . .the [age
verification screen] that the statue requires is already in existence with respect to
commercial pornography sites. . . . [W]hat the purveyors of [commercial pornography] do
is put in front of the screen provocative material that we submit would meet the definition
of harmful to children and make that available to everybody to entice people to go the
next step to use their credit card or their age identification mechanism . . . .
Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, COPA I, 542 U.S. 656 (No. 03-218).
311. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877 (1997).
312. The Third Circuit feared that adults would be unwilling to provide personal information,
such as a credit card number, especially if the material they wish to access is sensitive or
controversial. COPA IV, 322 F.3d 240, 259 (3d. Cir. 2003).
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Moreover, this proposed regulation could evade the Court’s strict scrutiny
analysis. Because the regulation would target only sites with obscene teaser
ads and credit card verification screens, it would not affect protected speech.
Safe-sex Web-sites, rape counseling sites and medical and educational sites
would be well outside the proposed regulation’s scope. When a regulation
affects only unprotected speech, as this regulation would, it is not subject to
strict scrutiny.
Rather, Congress can freely regulate, criminalize, or
completely ban the speech despite the First Amendment.313 As such, the
regulation would not have to represent the least restrictive means available.
Despite the existence of filtering technology, this narrow statute could survive
judicial scrutiny.
In COPA V, Justice Kennedy emphasized the potential for a statute that
utilizes harsh criminal penalties, with only an affirmative defense for
protection, to chill protected speech.314 The proposed regulation could largely
eliminate this problem. Only Web-sites that are both obscene and require a
credit card before allowing entry would be subject to the regulation. Very little
protected speech could fall into this narrow category. Thus, speakers engaging
in protected speech would be less likely to fear that the regulation could affect
them, and, in turn, less likely to self-censor. Further, the district court in
COPA I suggested that a possible remedy to COPA’s chilling effect could be to
incorporate the elements of its affirmative defense into the crime itself.315 By
imposing restrictions only on those who have verification screens, this
proposed regulation would do just that.
The harsh penalties that the CDA and COPA imposed, including thousands
of dollars in fines and up to two years imprisonment, also led to their
downfall.316 In American Library Ass’n, part of the Court’s justification for
upholding legislation that encouraged libraries and schools to install filters was
that the statute merely withheld funds instead of imposing harsh penalties.317
To ensure that a new regulation is acceptable, Congress would be well-advised
to impose a lesser penalty on speakers. An act with the CDA’s or COPA’s
daunting sanctions could chill the speech of even those outside the statute’s
scope.
B.

Non-legislative Measures

The hypothetical regulation proposed in Section A could possibly pass
judicial scrutiny and would affect Congress’s goal of eliminating obscene
teaser ads. But would the passage of such a statute really protect our children?

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
COPA V, 542 U.S. 656, 670–71 (2004).
COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(d), 231(a) (2000).
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 212 (2003).
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The district court in COPA I found that over forty percent of all pornographic
Web-sites originate in foreign countries.318 The Supreme Court emphasized
that regulations on Internet speech in the United States could send Web
publishers overseas, where they could avoid penalty altogether.319 Further,
narrowing regulations to cover only teaser ads would still leave recreational
Web-sites and harmful emails and chatrooms wide open to minors. Thus, a
statute narrow enough to pass Court scrutiny does not protect children. Indeed,
even the broadest statute cannot cover a great deal of this harmful Internet
material. This Section discusses some more effective solutions as well as some
of the alternatives Congress has already put into place to protect children.
1.

Blocking and Filtering Technology

As the courts have emphasized, blocking and filtering technology may be
the best alternative to protect children from Internet pornography. This
technology can block explicit images in the United States and abroad, whether
on the Web, in emails, or in chatrooms. In Playboy, the Court considered
legislation that would protect children from unscrambled cable signals by
forcing cable providers to eliminate or reschedule indecent programming.320
Because households have the option to block the transmission of unwanted
channels, Congress’s legislation was not the least restrictive means
available.321 Filtering technology is analogous to a blocked cable transmission.
Those who wish to protect their children can, leaving others to browse the
Internet and speak freely.
The effectiveness of a filter will depend, in part, on the type of filter
utilized. Today, there are four filter options: client-side filters, content-limited
Internet providers, server-side filters, and search engine filters.322 Client-side
filters allow an adult to configure the filter and choose the materials he or she
wishes to block.323 Under a content-limited system, the Internet provider will
supply access to a portion of the Internet, while blocking the remainder.324 All
of the Internet provider’s customers receive the same limited service. Serverside filters are best for schools or libraries, where all users must conform to the
same policy regarding Internet use.325 Finally, there are search engine filters,
which will block out inappropriate materials that are returned in an Internet
318. COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 484.
319. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 667.
320. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 806–07 (2000).
321. Id. at 825–27.
322. Emily R. Novak, Comment, Lost in Cyberspace: An Analysis of How the Supreme Court
May Help Children Find Their Way Safely on the Internet, 14 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. &
POL’Y 325, 355–56 (2004).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
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search, but will not block a site when the exact address is typed into the
address bar.326
Blocking and filtering technology appears more effective than the CDA or
COPA, but as the courts have pointed out, it has its problems. A reporter for
Time recently wrote of her experience with filtering devices, stating that some
devices “either fail to block pornographic websites altogether or block so many
sites that your browser becomes unusable.”327 Thus, parents may want to
consider another alternative: protective monitoring. A protective monitor
allows an adult to see the Web-sites that his or her child has previously
accessed.328 Unlike filtering, this alternative cannot prevent a minor from
reaching inappropriate Web-sites; but knowing that an adult can retrace their
steps may deter children from intentionally seeking out pornographic
materials.329
No one device provides the perfect solution for safe Internet use for
children. The answer, however, may not be to implement one single line of
defense against unwanted materials. According to the National Research
Council, a blend of technical and educational steps could be the ideal way to
protect children.330 Thus, a filter, together with an educated child and parental
supervision may be the best bet. Parents must educate themselves and
understand that filters and monitors should supplement adult supervision, not
replace it.
2.

Congressional Measures

Although it will be difficult for Congress to create COPA-like legislation
that is both constitutional and effective, Congress may be able to use other
means to reach its goal of protecting children. Already, it has created the Dot
Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002.331 The Act mandated the
creation of an entire domain, “dot kids,” that contains only material that is
appropriate for children under thirteen.332 George Bush signed the Act into
326. Id. at 356.
327. Anita Hamilton, The Web Porn Patrol, TIME, July 12, 2004, at 87. The author noted that
when using one filtering device she was unable to log onto a Nickelodeon Web-site, a Web-site
designed especially for children. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. “No single approach can provide a solution, since any one approach alone can be
circumvented with enough effort. A balanced mix of strategies is needed.” David Lazarus, Net
Porn Filters Just Don’t Work, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/
2002/11/13/BU158763.DTL (last visited February 1, 2005) (quoting former Attorney General
Richard Thornburgh, chairman of the committee that prepared the NRC’s study).
331. See Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-317, 116 Stat.
2766 (2002). The “dot kids” domain can be found at http://www.kids.us.
332. Id. at § 2; see MARCIA S. SMITH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INTERNET:
STATUS REPORT ON LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT CHILDREN FROM UNSUITABLE
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effect in December of 2002, stating: “[W]e must give our nation’s children
every opportunity to grow in knowledge without undermining their
character . . . we must give parents the peace of mind knowing their children
are learning safely.”333 Committee reports liken this domain to the children’s
section of a library: it is entirely appropriate for children, without burdening
adult speech in any way.334 Today, more than 1,700 dot kids domain names
have been sold.335
Congress has also made it easier for children to browse the Internet
without accidentally accessing pornographic materials. Under the “Truth in
Domain Names” provision of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to
End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003,336 it is a crime to use a
misleading domain name to deceive a person into viewing Internet obscenity or
to deceive minors into viewing material harmful to them.337 Prior to the Act,
typing “whitehouse.com” rather than “whitehouse.gov” into a Web-browser
would take the Internet user to a hard-core pornography site.338 Today, the Act
prohibits this and imposes criminal penalties on those who use such misleading
Web addresses.
In the future, Congress may also be able to utilize its spending power to
protect children from harmful Internet materials. In American Library Ass’n,
the Court upheld a statue that allowed the government to withhold funds from
public schools and libraries that fail to implement filtering technology.339 The
Court stated that Congress had provided the funds so that libraries and schools
could provide Internet access, thus, Congress could condition receipt of the
funds on whether they are used in the manner anticipated and authorized.340 In
COPA V, the Court suggested that Congress further utilize this power to
provide “strong incentives” for the development of filtering technology and its
implementation home.341
Congress’s taxing power could also be utilized to help protect children.
Tax incentives could encourage individuals to implement filtering technology
and set off the cost of doing so. In fact, the latest bills entertained by both the
House and Senate have done just that.342 Among other things, the bills require

MATERIAL ON THE WEB 5 (May 26, 2004), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/
data/2004/upl-meta-crs-5804/RS21328_2004May26.pdf.
333. Novak, supra note 322, at 358–59.
334. Id.
335. SMITH, supra note 332, at 5.
336. Pub .L. No. 108-21 § 521, 117 Stat. 650, 686.
337. Id.
338. LIPSCHULTZ, supra note 101, at 188–89.
339. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003).
340. Id. at 212.
341. See COPA V, 542 U.S. 656, 669 (2004).
342. See S. 1507, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3479, 109th Cong. (2005).
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Web providers that sell Internet pornography to pay a twenty-five percent tax
on the amounts charged to customers.343
V. CONCLUSION
As Justice Breyer’s dissent in COPA V emphasized, “No one denies
that . . . an interest [in protecting children] is compelling.”344 However, courts
have also expressed that no matter how compelling the interest, free expression
on the Internet is worthy of protection, too. Ultimately, it seems unlikely that
COPA will pass judicial scrutiny despite the Supreme Court’s recent refusal to
hold it unconstitutional. It is difficult to conceive of technological advances or
other evidence that the government could produce on remand to cure COPA’s
many pitfalls. The courts have sent a message: This ineffective statute is not
worth the burden on speech that it would impose.
As outlined above, the Court has not precluded Congress from protecting
children from Internet obscenity. Thus far, Congress has encouraged the use
of filters in public libraries and schools, created a safe domain especially for
children, and enacted legislation to make it less likely that a child will
inadvertently stumble upon pornographic material. In the future, Congress
may be able to utilize its spending and taxing powers to further encourage the
development and use of filtering technology. The Court’s holding in COPA V
does not leave children unprotected. It merely requires Congress to protect
children in a way that does not infringe on our new, but fundamental right to
free speech on the Internet.
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